Abstract: IEEE 802.11 wireless networks have gained increasing popularity in recent times, providing users with both mobility and flexibility in accessing information. Existing solutions for wireless LAN networks have been exposed to security vulnerabilities and previous study has addressed and evaluated the security performance of IEEE 802.11 wireless networks using single sewerclient architecture and simple traffic models. This research investigated the effect of multiple security mechanisms on the performance of multi-client congested and uncongested networks. The performance effect of different TCP and UDP packet sue distributions on secure networks was also studied. The benefits of this wireless network study focus on determining ways in which to configure wireless networks such that security requirements can be met in relation to quantifiable performance impact in practical situations.
Introduction
The market for wireless communications has experienced incredible growth over recent years and wireless LANs have rapidly become a very important network architecture offering benefits of increased flexibility and mobility. Unlike a traditional wired LAN, users can access servers with much greater freedom. Mobility in IP architecture as well as mobility between wireless LANs and wireless WANs enhances these benefits even further.
Such benefits of mobility and access come with significant security and performance requirements. The importance of maintaining secure and reliable connections between 'the communicating parties is often underestimated or even ignored. Security risks in wireless networks are equal to the sum of the risk of operating a wired network plus the new risks introduced as a result of the portability of wireless devices [I] . To reduce these risks, organisations need to adopt security measures and practices which lower such risks to a manageable level. This paper describes investigations into the performance of the implementation of the IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN security architectures. In particular it builds upon the earlier work reported in [2] which is based upon a single client and basic traffic models. Although previous research has evaluated TCP and UDP performance over wireless LANs [3; 4; 51 such work has not taken into account the impact of the different IEEE 8 0 2 . 1~ security mechanisms outlined in Section 3.2.
This paper describes the interaction between different security mechanisms and their effects on performance (response time and throughput) of congested and uncongested networks in conjunction with contention resulting from the use of multiple clients. Further, this paper describes the effects of different TCP and UDP packet size distributions on network performance, under the different security mechanisms specified by IEEE 802.1~.
Security Architectures in Wireless LANs
Wireless LANs provide greater flexibility and portability than do traditional wired LANs. Unlike a wired LAN, a wireless LAN connects computers and other components to the network via a wireless Access Point (AP). IEEE 802.11 is an intemational standard which provides transmission speeds ranging from 1 Mbps to 54 Mbps in either the 2.4 GHz or 5 GHz frequency bands. In addition it incorporates the IEEE 802. ix authentication protocol (an enhancement for default WEP authentication) which employs port-based network access control. It is used for communication between wireless clients and an AP, while RADIUS operates hetween an AP and an authentication server. IEEE 8 0 2 . 1~ was proposed to address WEP vulnerabilities by providing access control and key distribution to any (wired or wireless) Ethernet port.
The link layer security provisions in the IEEE 802.1 1 standards are all vulnerable to attacks. Therefore in practice, implementations need to deploy additional higher-levei security mechanisms such as access control, end-to-end encryption, password protection, authentication, virtual private networks, firewalls, etc and assume WEP as a very basic layer of security only.
The understanding of the security mechanisms associated with each of the IEEE 8 0 2 . 1~ options as well as the associated performance issues when typical applications are overlaid, in each case, needs to be carefully quantified.
The IEEE 802.11 committee has set up task group IEEE 802.11i [6] and further work is underway to enhance the security and authentication mechanism of the current IEEE 802.11 standard. Their work has progressively resulted in the following developments: expansion of the IEEE 802.11 standard with IEEE 8 0 2 . 1~ [7] 
I Experimental Configuration
The experiments were based upon Windows XP (clients) and W2000 Server as both have built-in implementations of the IEEE 8 0 2 . 1~ authentication protocol. As shown in Figure 1 , the experiments were conducted using: One Server Ethereal Network Analyser [lo] was used to capture live network statistics and the measurements were collected from the server.
Securiry Layers
The following eight security layers (mechanisms) were chosen to present a hierarchical order of the security mechanisms available from both the IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 802.1~ standards:
I .
2.
3.
4.
5.

.
I.
8.
No security: this is the default security setting provided by vendors. MAC address authentication: this layer provides MAC address authentication camed out at the AP. WEP authentication: the shared key authentication method specified in the IEEE 802.1 1 standard. WEP authentication with 40-bit WEP encryption: this layer adds the RC4 encryption algorithm. WEP authentication with 128-bit WEP encryption: this layer is the same as above using 128-bit keys. EAP-TLS authentication: this is the PIU-based authentication method supported by IEEE 802.1x, using digital certificates to authenticate the user. EAP-TLS with 40-bit WEP encryption: the combined effect of these tools provides the strongest layer of encryption and authentication using persession keys. EAP-TLS with 128-hit WEP encryption: this layer is the same as above using 128-bit keys.
The first five security layers are consistent with the IEEE 802.1 1 standard while security layers 6 to 8 are provided by the IEEE 8 0 2 . 1~ standard.
IEEE 802. l x Model Implementation
The IEEE 8 0 2 . 1~ model consists of the IEEE 802.11 access mechanism using open and shared key authentication, WEP encryption and port-based authentication. By combining these protocols (as security layers 6 to 8), the model provides a controlled wireless network with user identification, centralised authentication, and dynamic key management.
For security layers 6 to 8, a RADIUS server was used to provide dynamic key management and centralised authentication (see Figure 2 , where the server and one of the clients are shown). The authentication method chosen for the experiments was EAP-TLS as the IEEE 8 0 2 . 1~ model does not support end-to-end security, because privacy and confidentiality are only ensured on the wireless link by the WEP, but not enforced on the wired countelparts'.
Wireless users were treated as if they existed in one subnetwork of an organisation's intranet. Specific IP addresses were assigned to the wireless users, AP and different components of the server. The RADIUS server and certificate authorities were added to the basic network structure to provide the IEEE 8 0 2 . 1~ authentication support (Figure 3 ). The RADIUS server supported wireless user sign-on, and a certificate authority was used to issue certificates to users for EAP-TLS authentication.
Traflc Generation Engine
The IP Traflc tool can generate, receive, capture and replay IP traffic, and measure end-to-end performance and Quality of Service (QoS) over any IP fixed or mobile network and can manage several simultaneous IP connections. In these experiments the following traffic characteristics were selected as a result of a number of live experimental tests. 
Experimental Procedures
In the first set of experiments, the throughput and response times of two traffic types (TCP and UDP) were measured under different security mechanisms. The experiments were then repeated for two and three clients. Two different traffic flow rates were configured in the traffic generator: 12 Mbps (to represent a congested network) and 500 Kbps (to represent an uncongested network). In the second set of experiments, throughput was studied as a function of different packet sizes, under three different security mechanisms. Throughput was measured for both TCP and UDP traffic types.
Performance of Securify Mechanisms
The experiments followed the eight security layers described in Section 3.2. An infrastructure mode of operation and a single cell were used with three clients. Performance measures were gathered by running five repetitive tests at each security configuration. Experiments evaluating the performance of TCP were separated from UDP's and each set was conducted for different numbers of clients. Results were collected through log files generated by the trafiic generator and the Ethereal monitoring tool. Data were analysed, at the corresponding 95% confidence interval.
Effect of security mechanisms on performance
In the first part of the experiments, the traffic flow rate was set to 500 Kbps to represent a lightly loaded network. Figure 4 illustrates the throughput of TCP and UDP traffic types against each of the security layers. These results confirmed the general trends reported in [l I], that normally the stronger the security mechanism implemented, the poorer the network performance, although the degradation is certainly not linear.
s.sunq La"., The performance of TCP and UDP can also he compared. Since the TCP protocol uses a congestion control mechanism, it is significantly slower than the UDP protocol in congested networks, especially when WEP encryption is applied. The TCP throughput in congested networks averages to about 20% of UDP throughput at security layers 4, 5 , 7 and 8 and 85% of UDP throughput at security layers I, 2,3 and 6 ( Figure 5 ).
Effect of adding more clients
To evaluate the performance of the network in a secure multiclient environment, the experiments were repeated using two and three clients. The results showed that as the number of stations increases, the overall throughput decreases and its variance increases. However, that study did not take into account the effect of having different security mechanisms' in place.
Effect of variouspacket sizes onperjomance
As described in Section 3.5, four fixed packet sizes, i.e. 100, 500, 1000, 1500 bytes were chosen in order to evaluate their ' Similarrcsults were observed for TCP traffic 'As detailed in Section 3.2. 
Results
Evaluation of the performance impact resulting f?om implementing various security layers demonstrates some interesting results dependant largely upon the number of clients and the network loading. In the case of a single client testhed [2] although in general the performance degraded with increasing level of security complexity -particularly as IEEE 8 0 2 . 1~ functionally was added -it was clear that using WEP functionality such as MAC authentication and WEP encryption had little performance impact thus dispelling the belief that adding any security to a lightly loaded wireless LAN will have a detrimental effect'.
In the case of multiple clients and a congested This can be seen when security laycrs I , 2, 3 and 6 are averaged (WEP not used) and compared with security layers 4, 5, 1 and 8 also when averaged (WEP used) and shown in Figure 5 . Far UDP this can also be derived from thc "I client" column in Table I is not enough bandwidth available and packets can be dropped at the AP.
WEP resynchronisation:
The loss of a single hit of a data stream encrypted under RC4 causes the loss of all the data following the lost hit as data loss desynchronises the RC4 encryption and decryption engines [13] . The resynchronisation problem gets worse as more hits become lost. Since most IEEE 802.11 b implementations drop entire packets during congestion, such packets will have to be resent by the clients, which will result in performance degradation in congested networks.' When there is not enough bandwidth in the network, the buffer at the AF' fills up and drops packets.
It has been shown that the overhead resulting from encrypting each individual packet will only have a negative performance impact only when the network becomes congested. Use of authentication such as EAP-TLS has an initial overhead but its effect depends upon the frequency of reauthentication and the characteristics of the traftic flow.
The performance of TCP and UDP traffic has already been compared and evaluated (Section 3.6.1) as has the effect of adding additional clients (Section 3.6.2) and varying the packet size in congested networks (Section 3.6.3). 
Conclusions and Future Work
The experiments used EAP-TLS authentication, which employs digital certificates in order to authenticate users. Protected EAP (PEAP) [16] , proposed by RSA, Cisco and Microsofi, is an example of another commonly used IEEE 8 0 2 . 1~ authentication mechanism. It provides mutual authentication and key generation, protects user authentication and supports rapid reauthentication. Further research could be carried nut to investigate the effect of PEAP on the performance of congested and uncongested networks. Another area of research would be to evaluate the effect of WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) -an extension to IEEE 802.11 RSN [6] -as well as that the performance of software versus hardware implementations of encryption systems.
Roaming supports client stations moving freely from one cell (the AF' coverage area) to another. When this occurs, the transferring of credentials is necessary to ensure a secure connection. This scenario could involve reinitiating a search for an AP in the same manner as a client does, or by using other methods, such as referencing a table built during the previous association [17] . Current research was limited to a single AP ' This highlights the problems associated with using RC4 over IEEE 802.1 I networks [12] . and future work could cany nut a set of similar experiments with multiple APs. As mobility increa-m wireless LANs to wireless WANs (seamless handoff), further research could be carried out to examine the ability of maintaining a secure connection without reassociation and reauthenticatinn.
This research examined one type (the infrastructure mode) of IEEE 802.1 1, and the results might not be applicable to ad hoc wireless networks. Furthermore, the research focused on IEEE 802.11b networks. Evaluation of the security performance of other 802.11 standards such as 802.11g and the use of WPA (WiFi Protected Access) is the subject of ongoing research.
